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INTRODUCTION
Cases in which employers argue for the existence or
expansion of their religious free exercise rights tend to be
litigated as if the employer and the government are the true
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author
thanks all who made the symposium possible.
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adversaries. 1 Structuring such litigation as employer versus
government seems sensible because the First Amendment
regulates the relationship between the government and its
people, in part, by limiting the government's power to legislate
regarding religion.2  Typically, the adjudication of First
Amendment rights defines and alters the relationship between
the government and the litigant. For example, when a statute
that limits a litigant's free exercise rights directly or indirectly
is invalidated, governmental power is pruned and the litigant's
freedom expands. 3 As long as the employer is a constitutional"person," the government-versus-employer structure appears
accurate. However, that characterization is incomplete.
When an employer's free exercise rights are at issue, the
employer's employees are also real adversaries. The expansion
of an employer's free exercise rights broadens the employer's
ability to structure the workplace as it wants and narrows the
employees' statutory rights.4 The employer's gain is the
employees' loss. The narrowing of employee rights is a by-
product of the employment at-will rule-the default rule in
nearly every state-which allows an employer to fire an
employee for almost any reason. 5 Employment statutes and
other public policy principles functionally limit the employment
1. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 701-02 (2012) (noting that the key issue in the employment
discrimination case is whether the First Amendment allows the government to
interfere in a church's selection of its minister through application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).
2. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
3. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (holding that the ministerial
exception barred ADA claim from being brought); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (invalidating part of Affordable Care Act
(ACA) in the face of a challenge based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's
(RFRA's) right to exercise religion).
4. An employer is not an employer unless it has employees who will be
affected by the employer's actions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ("The termIemployer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees .. "); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ("The term 'employee' means
an individual employed by an employer....").
5. See Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful
Dismissal Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 443
(2014) (noting that Montana is the only state that appears to deviate from an at-
will rule). For general discussions of the at-will employment rule, see Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law
Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513 (2014); Richard
Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional
Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453 (2008).
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at-will rule by eliminating some of the reasons an employer
may terminate an employee. When the expansion of employer
free exercise rights limits the reach of an employment statute
or regulation, the employer's latitude to structure the
workplace as it wants broadens. The employer's ability to fire
those who do not like how the employer structures the
workplace widens as the rights that the employer's employees
may exercise under the now limited statute narrow.6 When the
constitutional free exercise rights of employers are expanded,
the statutory rights of employees tend to be restricted, with
employees suffering decreased protection against workplace
harm by the employer. 7 Consequently, courts that adjudicate
employer free exercise rights ought to consider the rights of
employees as central to the dispute.
In its recent employer free-exercise cases, Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (Hosanna-
Tabor)8 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby
Lobby),9 the Supreme Court affirmed religious freedom rights
for employers as though it were affirming the religious free
exercise rights of individuals against government intrusion.10
The decisions largely declined to analyze the effects they would
have on the employees involved. The Court's treatment of the
adjudication of an employer's free exercise rights as an
adversarial dispute between the employer and the government
that merely concerns the limitation of government power over
the employer is problematic. Given the effect such litigation
can have on employee rights, the Court should reframe how it
decides such litigation and directly consider the rights of
employees in deciding similar cases.
This brief Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses
the Supreme Court's recent cases that address employer free
exercise rights. Part II notes problems that accompany
providing free exercise rights to employers. Part III explores
6. For example, the application of the ministerial exception, a functional
expansion of an employer's free exercise rights, negates any rights ministers may
have had under employment discrimination statutes to be free of disability
discrimination. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
7. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 170 (5th
Cir. 2012) (barring Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and ADA
claims in the face of employer's ministerial exception).
8. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694.
9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10. The Court alternately claimed that it was protecting the right of the
individual owners of the companies. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2468.
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the expansion of employer prerogative in the context of
providing employers additional free exercise rights. Part IV
considers problems that arise when employee rights are not
deemed central to litigation regarding employer free exercise
rights. The Article concludes by proposing a refraining of the
free exercise issue that will consider how to account for the
interests of the employer, its stakeholders, and its employees in
employer free exercise cases.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT EMPLOYER FREE EXERCISE
CASES
In its last few terms, the Supreme Court has decided two
particularly important employer free exercise cases. Hosanna-
Tabor involved a religious employer.' 1 Hobby Lobby involved
employers whose owners were devoutly religious. 12 In each
case, the Court extended the employer's free exercise rights
and narrowed employees' statutory-based rights. 13 The Court
did not seriously consider employee rights as a counterbalance
to the extension of the employer's free exercise rights in either
case.
A. Hosanna-Tabor
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the ministerial
exception bars an employment discrimination suit filed by a
minister challenging her termination by her religious
employer. 14 That exception-derived from the Free Exercise
and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment-allows a
religious employer to fire a minister for any reason without
regard to employment discrimination statutes that would
otherwise limit such termination. 15 In Hosanna Tabor, the
defendant church school fired Cheryl Perich, one of its
1I. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
12. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66.
13. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. There is a dispute between the
Hobby Lobby majority and dissent regarding whether any employees lost the right
to any contraceptives under the ACA. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759-60, 2787
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the exemption that appears to be required
under Hobby Lobby may affect how employees may receive the contraceptives at
issue. See id.
14. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
15. Id. at 701.
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teachers, when she pushed to regain her job at the school after
a medical leave. 16 The school argued that because Perich was a
minister, the ministerial exception allowed the school to fire
her without having to defend its reason for the firing. 17 Though
the dispute was between an employer and an employee about
an employment matter, the employer's First Amendment
religious rights controlled the decision.18
Perich was initially hired as a lay teacher at the school.1 9
After religious instruction, she was "called" by the congregation
and was commissioned as a minister.20 She then became a
called teacher at the school. 21 After Perich was diagnosed with
narcolepsy, she began the next school year on medical leave. 22
Eventually, a lay teacher was hired to cover her job for the
remainder of the school year.23 During that school year, Perich
was cleared to return to work by her physician, but was told by
the school that she could not return to work that year.24 The
church congregation offered to release Perich from her call in
return for payment of a portion of her health insurance
premiums if she would resign from her job.25 Perich declined to
resign and appeared for work.26 She was told there was no
longer a job for her at the school.27 In response, she threatened
to sue.28 In the ensuing weeks, the congregation rescinded
Perich's call, and she was fired as a teacher the day after her
call was rescinded. 29
Perich sued, arguing that the church school had violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 30 The school argued that
16. The Court deemed the church to have fired Perich. See id. at 700, 710.
However, given that the chairman of the school's board was involved in the firing
and she was a teacher at the school, the school arguably fired her. Id.
17. Id. at 702 ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering
with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.").
18. Id. at 710.
19. Id. at 700.
20. Id. at 699-700 (discussing the process of being called and noting that
Perich "receive[d] the formal title 'Minister of Religion, Commissioned"' after
taking the call).
21. Id. at 700 (noting that Perich became a called teacher during her tenure).








30. Id. at 701.
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the ministerial exception protected its decision and released it
from any obligation to justify Perich's firing.31 In response,
Perich argued that even though she was a minister, her
teaching job was not a position to which the ministerial
exception should apply.32 The Court agreed with the school,
noting that the ministerial exception stems from the principle
that the government cannot regulate the affairs of religious
entities. 33 A statute that forces a religious employer to retain a
minister the employer does not want to retain deprives the
employer of its freedom to freely control "those who will
personify its beliefs," and must yield.34 Consequently, the
church school was free to fire the minister, regardless of the
effect such firing had on the employee. 35 As a result, a dispute
that began as an employment discrimination suit ended as a
free exercise suit pitting the rights of a religious employer
against the government's right to regulate the employment
relationship. The absolute nature of the ministerial exception
makes many rights that the employee may appear to have
subject to the employer's free exercise rights. against the
government. 36 Perich's rights to be free of discrimination on the
basis of disability and free of retaliation for pressing her
employment rights were lost and were barely discussed by the
Court.37
31. Id.
32. Not surprisingly, given that Perich was originally hired as a lay teacher
and had been replaced by a lay teacher, the Court struggled to determine whether
the position was a ministerial position. See id. at 707-09; see also Kirby v.
Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. 2014) (noting that the
Hosanna-Tabor Court "appeared to take an approach akin to a review of the
totality of the circumstances" in determining who is a minister).
33. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705-06; see also Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 605
(asserting that the ministerial exception makes a court incompetent to hear
employment discrimination claims by ministers against their religious
employers).
34. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 710 ('The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her.
Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.").
37. However, she may retain other rights against the school. Id. at 710 ("We
express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including
actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers."); see also Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 602 (holding that contract
claims for firing may be viable though the ministerial exception bars employment
discrimination claims against employer).
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B. Hobby Lobby
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court ruled that a closely-
held, for-profit corporation must be exempted, based on the
exercise of its free exercise religious rights, from a regulation
requiring that an employer provide certain benefits to its
employees under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).38 The ACA requires that covered employers provide
preventive care and screenings for women without cost sharing
with the employee. 39 Pursuant to the ACA, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) developed regulations to
specify what health care benefits covered employers must
provide. 40 HHS determined that covered employers were to
provide certain forms of contraception to its employees. 41 HHS
exempted some religious, non-profit employers from its
regulations, but did not exempt for-profit corporations
otherwise required to provide coverage under the ACA.42 The
plaintiffs-all closely-held, for-profit companies-argued that
providing or being tangentially involved in providing some of
the required forms of contraception would violate their strongly
held religious beliefs. 43 Each plaintiff-employer had been
founded by individuals or families with strong religious beliefs
and had been run in conformity with those beliefs. 44
Though Hobby Lobby was decided under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), rather than directly under
the First Amendment, the employer's free exercise rights were
at issue because RFRA protects a person's (including a
corporation's) exercise of religion.45 The Court acknowledged
the free exercise rights of the corporate employers, though it
noted that recognition of such corporate rights is meant to
38. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 2759.
41. See id. at 2762-63.
42. See id. at 2762-64.
43. See id. at 2765-66.
44. See id. at 2764-66.
45. See id. at 2767 ("RFRA prohibits the 'Government [from] substantially
burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability' unless the Government 'demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b))).
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protect the rights of the owners of the corporation.46 The first
key issue under RFRA is whether a person's exercise of religion
is substantially burdened by the government's action.47 The
Court found that HHS's regulations substantially burdened the
plaintiffs' exercise of religion. 48 The second key issue under
RFRA is whether the government's action is justified by a
compelling governmental interest and represents the least
restrictive means of furthering the government's interest.49
The Court found that HHS's regulations were not the least
restrictive means of promoting the government's interests and
invalidated them.50
Hobby Lobby was decided as if it directly pitted the
religious rights of the employer against the right of the
government to regulate the employer-employee relationship
through the ACA. The government's right to regulate the
employer through the ACA and the employer's complementary
right to be free of government intrusion became the central
issues in the litigation, with the rights that employees might
lose through the invalidation of HHS regulations being largely
ignored.5 1 To be clear, the Hobby Lobby majority claimed that
the employees' right to contraception was untouched by the
ruling.52 Indeed, the Court did not believe it needed to analyze
the employees' right to contraception because, it believed, such
46. Id. at 2768 (noting that protecting a corporation is a legal fiction with the
purpose "to provide protection for human beings").
47. Id. at 2775.
48. See id. at 2775-79.
49. See id. at 2779.
50. See id. at 2781-82. Some religious entities have argued that an exemption
from the ACA's requirements is not enough. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (arguing that the
exemption may yet make them party to providing contraception and like medical
treatment); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp.3d
1225 (D. Colo. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-1540 (10th Cir., Dec. 27, 2013).
51. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 ("We must decide in these cases whether
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb et seq., permits the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-
insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held
religious beliefs of the companies' owners. We hold that the regulations that
impose this obligation violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government
from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless
that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
government interest.").
52. See id. at 2759-60.
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rights were unaffected by the ruling.53 Conversely, the dissent
argued that the Court's analysis improperly ignored the
decision's potential effects on employees.54 In addition, the
dissent suggested that if similar issues arose with respect to a
refusal to provide different medical care to which the employer
objected on religious grounds, such as blood transfusions, the
majority's approach would tend to allow the employer's
religious beliefs to trump the rights of employees, without
serious discussion of either the employer's objections or of the
employee's interests.55 The majority responded that, if issues
arose with respect to other forms of medical care, its analysis
would consider all possible implications of providing a religious
exemption. 56 Nonetheless, the Court's position left unresolved
precisely how the Court may consider employee rights in the
future when employer free exercise rights are at issue.
How employee rights ought to be factored into employer
free exercise cases is an important issue that must be
addressed. However, a preliminary issue regarding the
structure of employer free exercise cases must be examined
first. The decisions in Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby depend
on granting employers free exercise rights as if they were
natural persons. Part II explores whether treating employers
in this way is sensible.
II. PROVIDING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS TO EMPLOYERS
The Supreme Court has determined that certain employers
can exercise religion-based statutory and constitutional
rights.57 The basis for the Court's decisions appears to be that
an employer's free exercise rights represent the aggregation of
53. See id. at 2780.
54. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In the Court's view, RFRA
demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter
the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the
corporation owners' religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women employed
by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations
employ.").
55. See id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 2783.
57. When non-religious rights are provided to corporations to protect the
corporate assets, providing such rights may seem sensible. See id. at 2768
("Protecting corporations from government seizure of their property without just
compensation protects all those who have a stake in the corporations' financial
well-being.").
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the free exercise rights of particular stakeholders who are
closely associated with the employer. 58 Conceiving of employer
rights in such a manner and allowing the exercise of such
rights by an employer based on that conception is problematic.
First, an employer is not necessarily the alter ego of its owners/
stakeholders and is responsible for more than the acts of its
owners/stakeholders. Second, the idiosyncratic nature of
religious belief suggests that free exercise rights typically
ought to be extended only to natural persons. Third, even if the
collective free exercise rights of its stakeholders can be
reasonably located in a corporate employer, such
collectivization usually would be sensible only when the
employer was created solely to facilitate the exercise of those
free exercise rights, i.e., as a church or its equivalent.
A. Employers Are Not Necessarily the Alter Egos of Their
Owners
A corporate employer is not usually considered an alter ego
of its owners capable of exercising the same rights as those
owners. 59 This is true even when the corporate employer is
owned by a single person.60 A key purpose of incorporation is to
create an entity that is separate from its owners, with separate
rights and responsibilities. 6 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that a corporation is not merely a reflection of its
owners. 62 Rather than allow an owner to exercise constitutional
rights through its corporation, the Court has, in some
circumstances, limited an owner from exercising personal
constitutional rights precisely because the owner's corporation
58. See id. at 2768 ("[Pjrotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans
who own and control those companies.").
59. Cf. United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2013)
(discussing, though ultimately not using, the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil that is used when a party wants to treat a corporate owner as the alter ego of
the corporation).
60. The term "corporate employer" is used loosely to include corporations and
collective entities that consist of more than a single natural person, e.g.,
partnerships, associations, LLCs and the like.
61. Indeed, it is rare that the separation will not be honored. When the
separation is not honored, courts are deemed to have pierced the corporate veil.
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
62. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S 158, 166
(2001) (noting "that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical").
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was involved.63
In Braswell v. United States, the Court ruled that an
owner of a corporation could not assert Fifth Amendment
rights that he would have been able to assert had he run his
business as a sole proprietorship. 64 At issue was how to treat
certain business documents that had been subpoenaed. 65
Although business documents generally are not privileged, the
act of producing the documents pursuant to a subpoena can be
deemed to have testimonial significance that can trigger Fifth
Amendment protection for the person who produces the
documents.6 6 The act of producing the documents is the
equivalent of testifying that the documents are authentic and
are responsive to the subpoena. 67 Consequently, a person
whose act of production may be incriminating may have the
right to receive immunity under the Fifth Amendment for that
act of production before being forced to produce the
documents.68
The business documents of a sole proprietorship are
treated as personal documents of the owner rather than as
corporate business documents. The owner of a sole
proprietorship is generally entitled to immunity for the act of
producing such documents if the owner's act of producing the
documents is incriminating.6 9 Conversely, corporate business
documents are treated as the corporation's documents.70 Their
production comes with no Fifth Amendment protection for the
person who produces the documents. 71 Consequently, the
Braswell Court was faced with determining how to treat the
documents of a corporation that was run essentially as a sole
63. The Court's jurisprudence is not necessarily consistent. Compare Braswell
v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988) ("[Me have long recognized that, for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are
treated differently from individuals. This doctrine-known as the collective entity
rule-has a lengthy and distinguished pedigree."), with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) ("[E]xtending Fourth Amendment
protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others
associated with the company.").
64. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
65. Id. at 101.
66. Id. at 101-02.
67. Id. at 118.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
69. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
70. See id. at 105.
71. See id. at 114-15.
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proprietorship. 72 After running his business as a sole
proprietorship for approximately fifteen years, Braswell
incorporated the business and became sole owner and
shareholder of the company. 73 Though his wife and mother
served as corporate officers, Braswell had full and sole
authority over the corporation's business affairs. 74
Consequently, he argued that the corporate documents at issue
should be treated as if they were the documents of a sole
proprietorship. 75 Had the Court agreed with Braswell's
argument, Braswell's act of production would have had the
same testimonial significance as if he were still running the
business as a sole proprietor, and he would have been granted
immunity for his act of production. 76 However, the Court
disagreed.77
The Court explained that collective entities, such as
corporations and partnerships, have no Fifth Amendment
rights.78 Subpoenas for corporate documents are requests made
of the corporation, even though the subpoena might be directed
to the custodian of corporate records. 79 The custodian provides
those records as the corporation's agent, rather than in a
personal capacity.80 The custodian's act of production is the
corporation's act of production, so it cannot be a basis for act-of-
production immunity for the custodian even though the act of
production may incriminate the custodian.81 This is so even
though the documents would have been treated as the owner's
documents had the corporation been run as an unincorporated
sole proprietorship, with Braswell entitled to act-of-production
immunity.8 2 Thus, Braswell's loss of Fifth Amendment rights
72. See id. at 101-02.
73. Id. at 100-01.
74. Id. at 101.
75. Braswell argued that the size and nature of the corporation was such that
it should have been treated as his alter ego. See id. at 102.
76. See id. at 101-02.
77. See id. at 118-19.
78. Id. at 102.
79. The subpoena at issue was directed to Braswell personally. See id. at 101.
The government noted that it addresses subpoenas to individuals so that it may
force the individual to comply with the subpoena. See id. at 118.
80. See id. at 118 (noting that the act of production is the corporation's act).
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 104 ("Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole
proprietorship, Doe would require that he be provided the opportunity to show
that his act of production would entail testimonial self-incrimination.").
[Vol. 861152
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was a cost of incorporation.8 3
A corporation is separate from its sole owner and
shareholder in other contexts as well. For example, in Cedric
Kushner Promotions v. King, the Court treated the president/
sole shareholder and his corporation as separate entities for
purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 84 RICO, in part, prohibits a person
from conducting or participating in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,
i.e., multiple crimes.8 5 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Act to require that the enterprise and the person committing
the crime be separate entities.8 6 The Court determined that the
corporation and its sole owner were distinct entities, noting,
"The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct
from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with
different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal
status."87 Indeed, a corporation usually is legally separate from
its owner, even when the owner acts on the corporation's
behalf.88
83. Not surprisingly, that troubled the dissent. See id. at 130 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Braswell was the sole stockholder of the corporation and ran it
himself. Perhaps that is why the Court suggests he waived his Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination rights by using the corporate form. One does not always,
however, have the choice of his or her employer, much less the choice of the
business enterprise though which the employer conducts its business."). There is
an irony that the Court was so hostile to Braswell's claims but very solicitous of
Hobby Lobby's claims. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2759 (2014) ("In holding that the HHS mandate is unlawful, we reject HHS's
argument that the owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when
they decided to organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole
proprietorships or general partnerships.").
84. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161-62 (2001).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012); Kushner, 533 U.S. at 160.
86. Kushner, 533 U.S. at 160-61.
87. Id. at 163. The Court continued, "After all, incorporation's basic purpose is
to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own
it, or whom it employs." Id.
88. The Kushner Court's focus on the owner also being an employee of the
company is of no moment, as corporations may only act through their agents and
employees. Anything done on the entity's behalf must be done by someone else or
some other entity. Indeed, there is an irony in that the Court has suggested in
other circumstances that an owner with administrative duties is generally not
considered an employee of the entity. For a discussion of who may qualify as an
employee, see Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440
(2003).
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B. Corporate Acts Are Not Limited to the Acts of Owners
Even when owners' interests are precisely the same as
their corporation's interests, a corporation consists of far more
than its owners and their interests. The corporation is
responsible for corporate acts, which may include the acts of its
owners, officers, employees, and other agents acting on the
corporation's behalf.8 9 The corporation cannot necessarily limit
its responsibility for those acts, though it may attempt to
control what acts are taken in its name.90 The corporation is
more than just a manifestation of its owners' beliefs and is
responsible for more than its owners' actions. 91 Courts have
made that clear through respondeat superior liability for
corporations and sexual harassment liability for employers.
1. Respondeat Superior
A corporation may be responsible civilly or criminally for
actions taken on its behalf,92 with corporate responsibility often
taking the form of respondeat superior liability. 93 Respondeat
superior deems a corporation responsible for acts taken by
agents or employees ostensibly for the benefit of the company,
on the company's behalf, and in the scope of the employee's
employment or the agent's agency. 94 Such responsibility is
reasonable because corporations act through their employees
and agents. 95 Indeed, corporations may be responsible for
actions taken on its behalf even when an agent's actions are
89. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998) (noting that
at times the act of a supervisor becomes a corporate act).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting
that corporation may be liable for acts of agent or employee even when the agent
or employee has been forbidden from taking those acts); United States v. Ionia
Mgmt. S.A., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319, 324 (D. Conn. 2007) (noting that corporation
may be held liable for agent's actions even when those actions are contrary to the
corporation's instructions).
91. See Kushner, 533 U.S. at 166.
92. This has been so for over a century. See New York Cent. & Hudson River
R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For a more recent example, see United
States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2008).
93. Corporate criminal liability under the Model Penal Code is more
restrictive than under respondeat superior. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c).
94. See Singh, 518 F.3d at 249-50; Potter, 463 F.3d at 25.
95. See Kushner, 533 U.S. at 166; Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110
(1988) ("Artificial entities such as corporations may act only through their
agents .... ).
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inconsistent with corporate policies. 96 A corporation's policies
may be its guiding principles, but a company may be deemed
responsible for actions taken on its behalf, even if those actions
are inconsistent with the company's policies or principles. 97
2. Sexual Harassment
Employers may be liable for the acts of their agents and
employees when those agents and employees violate
employment discrimination laws.98 For example, employers
may be responsible when agents or employees sexually harass
other employees, even when the harassment does not serve the
employer's interests.99 An employer may be responsible for the
harassment even when the harassment is undertaken by
employees for their own purposes and does not inure to the
employer's benefit. 100  Indeed, employers may be deemed
responsible for acts occurring in the workplace, even when
those acts are antithetical to the desires of the owners or high-
level management.101
The Supreme Court has created a structure for assigning
employer responsibility when sexual harassment occurs. 10 2
When sexually harassing behavior yields actual tangible
detriment to the employee's terms, conditions, or privileges
(TCP) of employment or compensation, the employer will be
96. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972)
(noting that a corporation can be held responsible for actions taken contrary to its
corporate policies); see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.
1983) (noting that corporation can be held criminally liable for actions taken
contrary to corporate policy).
98. Title VII makes employers liable for the acts of their agents. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2012) (including "agent of employer" within the definition of
employer).
99. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793-94 (1998) (noting
that sexual harassment may not normally be in employee's scope of employment).
100. Some sexual harassment may be in the employer's interest. A workplace
that functions more smoothly overall with an atmosphere that could be considered
harassing may condone harassment. However, that is usually not the case. See id.
at 794 ("[T]he courts have emphasized that harassment consisting of unwelcome
remarks and touching is motivated solely by individual desires and serves no
purpose of the employer.").
101. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 ("The harassing supervisor often acts for
personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the
employer.").
102. See id. at 752-53; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790; Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013).
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liable under Title VII for such harassment. 10 3 The employer is
liable, in part, because actual job detriment cannot occur
unless someone cloaked with authority from the employer
acts. 104 For example, an employee is not terminated until the
employer, in the form of an agent with authority, fires the
employee. 0 5  When coworkers harass an employee and
constructively alter the employee's TCP of employment, they
trigger hostile work environment (HWE) harassment, for which
the employer will be liable if the employer negligently allowed
the harassment. 10 6 Employer responsibility is trickiest when a
supervisor's conduct triggers HWE harassment. Under those
circumstances, the Court deems the employer vicariously liable
for supervisor-caused HWE harassment, subject to an
affirmative defense. 10 7  The two-part affirmative defense
requires that the employer have a reasonable system for
deterring or remedying harassment and that the employee
unreasonably fail to use the system. 10 8 This careful allocation
of responsibility is based on the supposition that an employer
may be responsible for some, but should not necessarily be
responsible for all, workplace activity that it reasonably
attempted to prevent.10 9
The Court's sexual harassment doctrine confirms that an
employer can be deemed responsible for actions taken by
employees and agents on the employer's behalf. Employers
cannot avoid liability merely by suggesting that their
103. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786. Such harassment is usually called quid pro
quo harassment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53.
104. See id. at 761-62 (noting that a supervisor's act is effective because it is
an act that the employer has empowered the supervisor to take).
105. See id. ("A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits. . . Tangible employment actions are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.").
106. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 (noting negligence standard applies to
determine employer liability for co-worker harassment that yields HWE).
107. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
108. See id. at 805 (noting the two-part affirmative defense requires "that the
employer had exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it
when it might occur, and that the complaining employee had failed to act with
like reasonable care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise
to present harm that could have been avoided"); Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 (noting
the two-part affirmative defense against supervisor-triggered HWE harassment).
109. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (discussing statutory policy that recognizes
that employers who seek to prevent sexual harassment should be able to avoid
liability in some circumstances).
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employee's acts were not consistent with the employer's sexual
harassment policies. The Court has been careful in attempting
to determine which employee acts should be considered the acts
of the employer. However, the Court never questioned that
some acts of employees should be considered acts of the
employer for which the employer is responsible, even when
those actions do not reflect the employer's policies or values.
C. Gathering Shared Religious Belief in the Corporate
Employer
The Supreme Court has recognized the free exercise rights
of some corporate employers in two contexts: where the
employer's owners are deeply religious and where the employer
is a religious organization. 110 The Court does so by gathering or
collectivizing the free exercise rights of some of the employer's
stakeholders and treating those rights as though they are the
free exercise rights of the employer.'1 1 That is particularly
problematic when the employer is a for-profit corporation. It is
somewhat less troubling when the employer is a religious
organization.
1. The Individual Nature of Religious Belief
The individual and idiosyncratic nature of religious belief
makes treating the religious beliefs of an employer's owners as
the religious beliefs of the employer difficult to justify. Those
who share very similar religious beliefs may find that those
beliefs lead individuals to varied conclusions even when those
beliefs are applied to a common set of facts. Disputes abound at
the highest levels of churches regarding how to apply doctrine,
even among clergy who presumably share the same religious
beliefs.11 2 That any group of people, but especially lay people,
110. Title VII specifically allows certain religious employers to discriminate in
employment on the basis of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e) (2012) (detailing religious employer exemptions for religious
discrimination). Title VII does not provide such employers exemptions to
discriminate on any of Title Vii's other bases.
Ill. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014)
(noting that protecting the free exercise rights of the corporation merely protects
the free exercise rights of the corporation's owners).
112. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado About
Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro
Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 141, 142-46 (2010) (discussing the Episcopal
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can share religious beliefs so completely that those religious
principles can be sensibly treated as one for purposes of
running a corporation they jointly own may not be realistic.
Religious beliefs can be deeply personal. A religious belief
need not be central to a person's religion or even recognized by
the person's religion at all to be treated as a religious belief
that must be legally protected. 113 Indeed, the belief need not be
associated with any particular religion, or with religion at
all,114 and can be unreasonable, yet still be protected."15 The
belief must be honored almost without question, no matter how
idiosyncratic, if it is sufficiently deeply held by the
individual. 116
Given all of these complications, it is unclear whether the
religious beliefs of multiple owners can be identified and
transmitted to a corporate body as a single belief structure in
any coherent fashion. 117 Certainly, a group of owners may
agree that a corporate policy sufficiently reflects their religious
beliefs to be acceptable to all owners. 118 However, that is not
the same as suggesting that the owners' beliefs constitute a
single, shared corporate belief structure on which corporate
free exercise rights can or should rest. That is, rarely can an
Church's internal disputes regarding homosexual clergy); Laurie Goodstein &
Elisabetta Povoledo, No Consensus at Vatican as Synod Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/world/europe/no-
consensus-at-vatican-as-synod-ends-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UV2S-
33NM (discussing a contentious Catholic synod of bishops that discussed how the
Church should address issues of homosexuality and divorce).
113. See Davis v. Ft. Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that
courts cannot inquire into whether a religious belief is "central to the religion" or"a true religious tenet"); Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., No.
1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (noting
possibility that veganism can be protected as a moral or ethical belief akin to a
religious belief).
114. See Davis, 765 F.3d at 485 (noting that covered religious beliefs need only
be "moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held
with the strength of traditional religious views" (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
(2015))).
115. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014)
(noting that courts have no authority to determine whether religious beliefs are
reasonable).
116. Davis, 765 F.3d at 486 (noting that the key to protection is not whether
the belief is a religious tenet, but whether the belief is religious and the party"sincerely believed [the belief] to be religious in her own scheme of things").
117. Identification of shared belief is necessary not to prove sincerity, but to
make sure that the corporation's desire to avoid the strictures of the law is
religion-based and not business-based.
118. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
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employer be considered to be exercising its own free exercise
rights, rather than merely asserting the disparate free exercise
rights of its owners. Alternatively, it is just as possible that
corporate policy merely reflects the religious beliefs of the
employer's most powerful owner. However, if the employer's
sole purpose is to facilitate the free exercise rights of its
stakeholders, allowing the employer to exercise the collective
free exercise rights of its stakeholders may be sensible.
2. The Purpose of the Entity
The Supreme Court has suggested that a corporate
employer's free exercise rights merely constitute the collection
of free exercise rights of certain stakeholders in the
employer."19 That may be sensible when the employer is a
church or church-related entity, but may make little sense
otherwise. The Court suggests that free exercise rights
provided to some corporate employers can be provided to
similar corporate employers on similar terms.120 Consequently,
providing free exercise rights to Hosanna-Tabor (a church
school) is similar to providing free exercise rights to Hobby
Lobby (a for-profit corporation owned by devout people).121 The
Court is correct that the form of the entity is arguably
irrelevant. A church that is a corporation ought to have the
same free exercise rights as an unincorporated church.
However, it is not apparent why a for-profit corporation should
enjoy the same free exercise rights as a church that is a
corporation.1 22 The collectivization of the free exercise rights of
church members in a church is more easily justified than the
collectivization of the free exercise rights of owners of a for-
profit business. 123
119. See id. at 2768 (noting that Congress provided protection for owners by
including "corporations" in RFRA's definition of "persons").
120. See id. at 2770.
121. See id. at 2769-73 (explaining that for-profit and non-profit corporations
alike are covered by RFRA and its protection of the exercise of religion).
122. The Hobby Lobby majority might disagree. See id. at 2769-70 (suggesting
that both for-profit and non-profit corporations can exercise religion).
123. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("For
many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere
aggregation of individuals.").
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Collectivizing the free exercise rights of church members in
a church is understandable because a church's members adhere
to the church's doctrine. 124 Though the individual members of
the church may apply the doctrine differently, it is the church's
doctrine that they are trying to apply. The church is a
manifestation of its membership's free exercise of religion. To
the extent that free exercise is about following whatever
religion one believes, collectivizing the free exercise rights of
followers of the same church or religion is reasonable. The
adherents come to the church and presumably want to reflect
the church. Any mismatch between an individual adherent's
interpretation of church doctrine and actual church doctrine
reflects the adherent's mistake, rather than the church's
mistake. 125 Nonetheless, it is the free exercise rights of church
members that are protected by protecting the church's free
exercise rights. Consequently, though the church arguably
should technically have no free exercise rights of its own,
allowing the church to exercise or facilitate its members'
collective free exercise rights by deeming that exercise to be the
church's free exercise of religion may be sensible. 126
The collectivization of the free exercise rights of multiple
owners in their corporation is far less coherent. Even if all the
owners of an entity share a similar religious viewpoint and the
owners attempt to use the entity to advance their free exercise
rights, it is unclear that a for-profit corporate entity has a
shared religious viewpoint. Except in very rare instances, a for-
profit corporation is meant to reflect its owners. 127 The owners
do not adhere to the corporation; the corporation adheres to its
owners. 128 Consequently, siting the owners' free exercise rights
in the corporation appears precisely backward. The
corporation's actions can and should reflect the owners'
devotion to religious principles. However, there is no claim that
the corporation guides the owners, rather than vice versa.
124. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Slavery, Free Blacks and Citizenship, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 487, 493-94 (2013) (discussing adherence and church membership).
125. Of course, if a church member chooses a religious belief that is not a part
of church doctrine, that belief is protected as well. See supra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text.
126. The Court's language may appear to suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (focusing directly on the church's religious rights
rather than the religious rights of parishioners).
127. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
128. See id. ("Corporations, 'separate and apart from' the human beings who
own, run and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.").
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Where to site the free exercise rights of individuals is a
difficult issue. Principally, such rights should be sited in the
individual. Gathering them in a church and allowing the
church to exercise the rights collectively makes some sense in
that the church exists to facilitate the individuals' free exercise
of religion. 29 Gathering the free exercise rights of individuals
in a for-profit business makes little sense because the
corporation is a mere extension of its owners. The corporation
may reflect the owners' values, but it does not necessarily exist
to facilitate the owners' free exercise of religion. This suggests
that the Court ought, in many cases, to focus directly on the
free exercise rights of individual stakeholders rather than
treating them as the rights of the employer, even when a
church exercises them collectively. Before that issue is
addressed, the manner in which providing free exercise rights
directly to employers affects the workplace should be
addressed. Part III discusses how the expansion of the free
exercise rights of employers, church-related and not, broadens
the employers' prerogative to structure the workplace as those
employers see fit.
III. EXPANSION OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE
By broadening the free exercise rights of employers, the
Supreme Court has widened the latitude employers have to
make some employment decisions without considering
limitations imposed by federal law, including employment
discrimination law. 130 That is the result of invalidating some
applications of statutes that infringe on the constitutional
rights of employers. 131 However, the outer edge of the scope of
the employer's latitude is not clear, as the Court's decisions
have not provided clear restrictions on how much religious-
129. Indeed, the church can be deemed a repository of religious rights. See
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012) (noting that the First Amendment "gives special solicitude to the rights
of religious organizations").
130. That latitude can already be pretty broad. Not only can a religious
organization fire or refuse to hire an employee whose religious beliefs are
inconsistent with the organization's, an employee may not be allowed to sue for
harassment or retaliation based on religion. See Kennedy v. St. Joseph's
Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011).
131. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (noting that government may be
required to accommodate an entity's religious practices).
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minded employers can restructure the workplace and impose
workplace rules consistent with their beliefs. The uncertainty
regarding the employer's freedom to ignore statutes that
protect employee rights guarantees that the scope of an
employee's statutory employment rights will be fuzzy.
A. Employer Freedom Flowing from Recent Cases
Consistent with Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby,
employers have new freedom to shape their workplaces. At the
least, employers presumably can do what Hosanna-Tabor and
Hobby Lobby were allowed to do in their cases. A church school
should be allowed to fire a called teacher without justifying the
action. 132 A closely-held, for-profit company with devoutly
religious owners, who hold the same religious objections as
Hobby Lobby's owners, should be allowed to decline
involvement in providing the types of contraception to which
Hobby Lobby objected. 133 The bigger question is what other
actions employers may take based on the reasoning underlying
the two cases.
Employers ought to be allowed to do whatever an
objectively reasonable reading of Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-
Tabor allows them to do. However, employers may instead
attempt to do whatever they subjectively believe Hobby Lobby
and Hosanna-Tabor should allow them to do. A reasonable
interpretation of Hobby Lobby would appear to suggest that the
owners of a closely held, for-profit corporation can run the
corporation consistent with the owners' religious beliefs and
avoid the strictures of some parts of the ACA relating to
contraception if those strictures substantially affect the owners'
free exercise rights. 134 Employers could interpret Hobby Lobby
to cover additional types of corporations and to allow religion-
inspired restrictions on additional forms of health care,
employee benefits and health-related activity. 135 Similar issues
132. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710; Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran
Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (concerning the firing of a called
teacher at a Lutheran school).
133. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d
229, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing the argument of religious groups that do
not want to be involved in any way with providing contraception to employees);
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2014 WL
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exist with Hosanna-Tabor. Hosanna-Tabor allows a church
school to fire a minister, but does not specify how to determine
whether an employee is a minister or whether the court or the
employer should make the decision. 136 An employee need only
serve in a ministerial capacity to be subject to the ministerial
exception; the employee need not be an ordained minister.
Congregations may be, or may believe themselves to be,
relatively free to define which of their employees are ministers
or serve in a ministerial capacity. 137 Given that ministers can
be fired for any reason, the ability to define who is a minister is
the ability to define to whom the employment discrimination
laws will apply. 138 That can have serious implications,
particularly for workers who may not have considered
themselves ministers. 139
The Court has provided no clear stopping point for how far
employers can push their religious beliefs into the workplace.
The Court may be unable to put fundamental limitations on
the expansion of the free exercise rights of certain employers
given that constitutional rights are difficult to cabin and
religious beliefs are difficult to define. Hosanna-Tabor and
Hobby Lobby could be read broadly as holding that an
employer's religious beliefs should trump government
regulation whenever an individual's religious beliefs would
trump government regulation. 140  Such a reading might
encourage an employer to exercise its religious rights until told
to stop. If the cases are interpreted to suggest that protecting
4373617, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 3, 2014) (noting attempt to decline to renew
teacher's contract because she had undergone in vitro fertilization, which Diocese
viewed as "gravely immoral").
136. See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 606-07
(Ky. 2014) (discussing the uncertainty of the Hosanna-Tabor Court's analysis).
137. Indeed, Justice Thomas would leave the decision solely to the good faith
decision making of the church school. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 611 (noting that some
courts decline to decide who is a minister).
138. See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir.
2012) (deeming music director a minister). But see Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend Inc., No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2014 WL 4373617 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 3,
2014) (deeming language arts teacher not a minister).
139. See Kirby, 426 S.W.2d at 605 (noting that ministerial exception has been
applied to more employees than those with the title "minister").
140. The Hobby Lobby Court would probably argue otherwise. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (suggesting that Hobby
Lobby is a narrow decision and criticizing the claim that the decision could be
read broadly to cover additional medical procedures).
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the free exercise rights of an employer is as much of a positive
good as protecting the free exercise rights of individuals, the
exercise of those rights-which are rights of conscience-ought
to continue until the employer is required to stop. By not
hinting at or indicating a reasonable stopping point for the
expansion of an employer's constitutional free exercise rights,
the Court also does not indicate a reasonable stopping point for
the restriction of the rights of employees.
Providing no limitation on constitutional rights is sensible
in regular constitutional adjudication involving the struggle
between the individual and the government. Not specifying the
limits of a constitutional right may be sensible when the
expansion of a right primarily restricts the government.
However, when the expansion of the employer's rights is so
closely tied to the diminution of employee rights, the need for a
relatively clear limitation arguably exists. If the Court cannot
provide a reasonable limitation, it probably ought to reconsider
whether employers, as entities, should be provided free
exercise rights at all.
B. Overclaiming Free Exercise Rights
Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby extend the protection of
employer free exercise rights in ways that may provide a cost
incentive for the employer to exercise those rights. The ability
to fire a minister without concern for violating an employment
discrimination statute may be valuable. The ability to refuse to
provide insurance for certain forms of health care may also be
valuable. Even if the employer does not plan to save money
through the exercise of such rights, if the rights can be asserted
relatively costlessly, there may be an incentive to assert such
rights, if only not to lose them. This is not cynical. Any activity
that is costless may be more likely to be taken than if the
activity were costly. 14 1 Religious free exercise may be no
different. 142 That a free exercise right may be newly asserted
141. The effect of RFRA may be to make the choice less costly. See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (suggesting that RFRA stops government from putting
owners to the choice of "either giv[ing] up the right to seek judicial protection of
their religious liberty or forgo[ing] the benefits, available to their competitors, of
operating as corporations").
142. Consider the effects of making charitable religious contributions tax
deductible. Even if parishioners are called to give, they may give more when a tax
deduction is provided than when it is not provided.
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may not matter as long as the employer's or its owners'
religious beliefs exist when the free exercise right is
asserted. 143
Expanding an employer's free exercise rights may trench
on employee rights more broadly than is apparent. An
employer acts through its employees and agents. 14
Consequently, its religious rights will be protected and
asserted by employees and agents, including management.
Functionally, how those rights will be protected and asserted
will depend on the religious prerogatives of whatever decision
maker is cloaked with the employer's power. 145 However,
agents can misperceive the substance of an employer's religious
views or agents can be too aggressive in asserting those
religious views. 146 An agent-employee responsible for
implementing the employer's religious beliefs may substitute
his or her own religious beliefs for the employer's beliefs,
whether or not they align precisely with those beliefs. If the
agent-employee misapprehends the employer's religious beliefs,
the employer's beliefs will not be precisely reflected in the
agent-employee's decision making or workplace rules. This is
problematic, as religion-based decision making that abrogates
the effect of statutes is allowed only because the employer's
beliefs are religious and protected by the First Amendment. 147
Unless an employee affected by the agent-employee's decision
is willing to challenge the action and argue that the agent-
employee's action was based on the improper application of the
employer's religious beliefs, the decisions made based on the
agent-employee's religious beliefs will stand. That appears to
143. New claims of religiosity should be just as reasonable as old claims of
religiosity, if the claims are really derivative of the owners' claims of religiosity.
See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (noting that the
employee developed religious beliefs sometime after having been hired by
employer but finding the beliefs protected anyway).
144. The Court has suggested that corporate employers may act only through
their agents and employees. See Hobby Lobby, 134 U.S. at 2768; Braswell v.
United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988).
145. Indeed, agency costs arguably rise when the owners are allowed to
structure the workplace in a religious fashion and management refuses to do so.
146. In Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., the employer deemed an
employee's attire inconsistent with the employer's religious doctrine after
residents in the nursing home complained. 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011). However,
it was unclear whether the attire itself or the residents' reaction to the attire was
the cause for the termination.
147. Consider a human resources director who defines who is a minister more
broadly than the relevant congregation would.
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be a misapplication of the Court's judgment recognizing
expanded employer free exercise rights. 148
C. Implications
Free exercise cases are about freedom and prerogative.
Personal prerogative or conscience in the form of free exercise
rights may trump governmental regulation. 149 However, when
the entity seeking expanded free exercise rights is an employer,
free exercise involves providing prerogative to the employer in
the workplace. That can become a problem given that
employment statutes often intentionally limit the prerogative
that employers can exercise in the workplace.150
An employer's claim to additional free exercise rights tends
to manifest itself as the freedom to fire an employee, the
freedom to structure the workplace, or the freedom to make
workplace decisions the employer wants to make, without
government interference. 151 However, employers already have
substantial workplace prerogative. At-will employment, which
allows an employer to fire an employee for almost any reason,
is the default rule in almost all states. 152 Employment
discrimination statutes and public policy limit and regulate the
at-will nature of employment.153  Those limitations are
calibrated to make the employment relationship fairer than the
relationship would be otherwise and to limit the prerogative of
the employer. 154 The expansion of an employer's free exercise
rights may eventually leave the employee with the potentially
unpalatable option of working at a workplace governed by
148. Both the Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby Courts have suggested that
the opinions should be read relatively narrowly and as not restricting employee
rights. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 710 (2012); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783-84.
149. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (trumping the ADA); Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (trumping Health and Human Services regulations
promulgated pursuant to the ACA).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2008) (limiting bases on which employer can
alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of an employee's employment).
151. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (noting that the ministerial
exception gives the decision to hire or fire ministers to the church alone).
152. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
153. See Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 5, at 347 ("In the United States-
absent a constitutional, statutory, or public-policy provision or ruling restricting
the grounds for termination-nothing prevents the employer or employee from
terminating the employment relationship without cause or notice.").
154. See id.
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potentially limiting work rules allowed under the employer's
newly recognized free exercise rights, or quitting.
The expansion or reinterpretation of an employer's free
exercise rights can fundamentally alter the relationship
between employee and employer. That change is particularly
disruptive because employees have few options and employers
already exercise significant prerogative in the workplace.
Given that, employee rights should be at the core of the
discussion of the employer's free exercise rights. Part IV briefly
comments on the problems that attend not considering
employee rights and interests when adjudicating an employer's
free exercise rights.
IV. DANGERS OF IGNORING EMPLOYEE INTERESTS
Given that providing free exercise rights to employers
expands the employer's workplace prerogative and narrows
employee rights, employee rights should be at the core of
litigation regarding employer free exercise rights. They have
not been. The Hosanna-Tabor Court ignored its ruling's effect
on the employee; 155 the Hobby Lobby Court denied its ruling
had any effect on the litigants' employees. 156 Constitutional
litigation involving employers is problematic because people
whose interests need to be represented-the employees-may
be ignored if the litigation is considered to focus primarily on
the constitutional free exercise rights of the employer. This can
be particularly troublesome because constitutional change can
be near permanent. A decision grounded in statutory
interpretation can be changed or its effects can be blunted. 157
However, once a constitutional right exists, reversing course is
very difficult. 158
When the Court does not consider employee rights in
adjudicating employer free exercise cases, it does not fully
155. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (noting that the point of the
ministerial exception is to leave the decision to fire the minister to the church
alone).
156. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759-60 (2014).
157. For example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5, created a statutory fix in response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
158. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50
DUKE L.J. 1335, 1376-77 (2001) (discussing one-way ratchet argument that courts
can expand individual constitutional rights but should not narrow constitutional
rights).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
explore the possible implications of its decisions. Without the
employee's point of view as a part of the discussion, courts tend
to discount important employment discrimination goals, such
as fairness and equal treatment. 159 Similarly, the magnitude of
the harm to the workplace is less clear when employees'
interests are not considered. To be clear, this is not about
subjecting the employer's free exercise rights to a general
balancing test. Rather, it is about the Court determining how
far prerogative should extend in the context of providing free
exercise rights. 160 For example, even though a religious
employer can fire a minister for any reason under Hosanna-
Tabor, the Court may eventually need to determine how much
latitude an employer should have in determining whether an
employee is a minister. That discussion might be better
informed by a consideration of the statutory rights of the
specific employee at issue as well as those of other employees in
the workplace. In the absence of considering the effect a ruling
may have on employee interests, the Court may allow too much
latitude in the exercise of an employer's free exercise rights by
failing to properly define (and thereby reasonably limit the
scope of) an employer's free exercise rights.
Ignoring employee rights when adjudicating employer free
exercise rights may seem sensible. Free exercise rights are
constitutional rights that are supposed to trump mere
statutes. 161 Constitutional rights are also supposed to trump
government prerogative as reflected in statutes. 162 They do not
necessarily trump all of the employees' statutory or legal
rights. 16 3 Consequently, courts ought to consider employees'
159. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (applying an absolutist
ministerial exception limits employee from arguing that finding in favor of the
employee would vindicate employment discrimination goals).
160. At some point, accommodating the religious rights of employers may go
too far. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-45 (1987) (noting that, at some point,
accommodating the employer's free exercise rights may become "unlawful
fostering of religion" (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987))).
161. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(holding that "exercise of religion" provision in RFRA allows employer to avoid
certain requirements of the ACA).
162. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
163. See id. (noting that the ministerial exception may not bar a minister from
pursuing other claims against the church flowing from the minister's
termination); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (noting that the employer's
exercise of religion will not necessarily allow it to avoid all responsibilities under
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arguments regarding their statutory rights. Unfortunately,
given how the issue of employer free exercise rights is currently
framed, employees are very unlikely to have their statutory
rights seriously considered when the issue is the free exercise
rights of employers.
This is not a matter of simply having the employee sue to
enforce his or her statutory rights. Employee rights are not
necessarily addressed when employees sue to enforce their
statutory rights. Except when the employer is a governmental
entity, an employee suing for rights asserts those rights
against another private party-the employer. Consequently,
the enforcement of the statute and the employee's statutory
rights may depend on whether the statute that provides those
rights is considered too large an infringement on the
employer's free exercise rights.164 The statute can be analyzed
as the government's limitation of the employer's free exercise
rights if the employee's rights clash with the employer's free
exercise rights. Similarly, the dispute can be analyzed as an
Establishment Clause issue-if the employee is suing for his or
her own free exercise rights under the statute-depending on
how protective the statute is of the employee's free exercise
rights. 65 Nonetheless, the centrality of the employee's
statutory rights-the genesis of the suit-fades as the dispute
is reconfigured as a dispute involving the employer's rights and
government's regulation of those rights under the First
Amendment. Consequently, seriously considering employee
rights may require that the structure of employer free exercise
litigation be reframed to consider the parties whose rights are
truly at stake: the employee and the employer's stakeholders.
the ACA).
164. See Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 194 (4th Cir.
2011) (noting that Title VII's religious organization exemption represents a
balance between the government's right to regulate the employer and the
employer's right to be free to exercise religion).
165. If a statute is too protective of religious rights-employer's or
employee's-it can trigger Establishment Clause concerns. See Amos, 483 U.S. at
336 (discussing whether Title VII's exemption allowing religious employers to
discriminate on the basis of religion violated the Establishment Clause); Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90 (1977) (discussing whether Title VII's
requirement that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
practice violated the Establishment Clause).
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CONCLUSION
Free exercise litigation tends to involve the government
regulation of individuals. In most such litigation, the
adversaries are the individual and the government. There may
be spillover effects from the litigation's resolution that affect
non-parties, but the adversaries bear the brunt of the
litigation's results. That is not the case when an employer's
free exercise rights are at issue. In such cases, an employment-
related statute will usually be in dispute. If the government
loses, the employee loses and must bear the brunt of the loss. If
the employer loses, its stakeholders lose (their rights are
actually at issue) and must bear the brunt of the loss. Given
that the owners/stakeholders of the corporation and the
employees arguably are the real interested parties, their
interests in the litigation ought to be directly at issue.
The litigation of employer free exercise rights ought to be
reframed as a dispute between the stakeholders' free exercise
rights and the employees' rights under the relevant statute.
This refraining would require that the Court take seriously the
notion that the employer's stakeholders are the real parties
and their free exercise rights are actually at issue.
Consequently, the Court would need to ask, "How are the
stakeholders' free exercise rights affected by the application of
the statute at issue to the employee who has sued?" To be clear,
the question is not merely whether the stakeholders would
prefer that their entity's actions reflect their religious beliefs.
Presumably, they do want that. Rather, the question is
whether or how the stakeholders' free exercise rights are
harmed by having an entity with which the stakeholders are
associated comply with a statute that provides employee rights.
The question may seem to ask too much about the content of
the stakeholders' religious views. However, the Court has made
the question necessary by siting the stakeholders' collective
free exercise rights in the employer.
The core issue-how stakeholders' free exercise rights are
affected by the application of the statute at issue-remains the
same, but its implications change, depending on whether the
employer is a religious organization or a for-profit corporation
or some type of entity. The implications are different because
the nature of the transmission of the stakeholders' free exercise
rights through an organization differs depending on whether
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the organization is a religious organization or a for-profit
corporation. The transmission of church members' free exercise
rights through their church may be strong, whereas the
transmission of owners' free exercise rights though their
corporation may be weak.1 66 The issue is difficult to resolve,
but it is the right issue to consider. If the Court properly
considers the issue in future cases, it could eliminate some of
the problems inherent in litigating employer free exercise
rights.
166. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (noting the importance of "the
interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their
faith, and carry out their mission").
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